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Although tariffs are an essential factor in international trade, few studies evaluate 
the gravity equation with tariff rates for global trade, particularly because gathering data 
on tariffs and creating a tariff variable is time-consuming and laborious. However, 
Disdier et al. (2015) acquired data on applied tariff rates (i.e., lowest available tariff rates) 
from the MAcMap by the Centre d’Informations Internationales (CEPII) and introduced 
them into their gravity equation. They found a negative coefficient for the applied tariffs, 
indicating that lower applied tariffs lead to larger trade values. Recently, some tariff 
databases have become available, including the Tariff Analysis Online facility and the 
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World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS). Thus, the number of gravity studies with tariff 
variables is expected to increase. 
Limited studies result in a lack of clarity on the kinds of tariffs to be employed and 
the method for introducing these tariffs into the gravity equation. For example, it is 
assumed that applied tariffs can be used when all exporting firms use the lowest tariff 
rates, for example, regional trade agreement (RTA) rates for exports to RTA member 
countries. However, this assumption contradicts reality. For instance, Keck and Lendle 
(2012) showed that the share of imports under the RTA regimes out of the total imports 
is below 100%, even for products eligible for RTA regimes.1 Because exporters incur 
some costs to use preference regimes, particularly costs to certify the origin of goods, not 
all exporters use these available regimes. This implies that introducing only the applied 
tariffs into the gravity equation is not a rational strategy. 
This study examines tariff variables in the gravity equation. A gravity model is 
developed considering the coexistence of alternative tariff regimes: the most favored 
nation (MFN) regime and an RTA regime. In particular, the study introduces the tradeoff 
across MFN and RTA regimes discussed by Demidova and Krishna (2008) and 
Cherkashin et al. (2015). The gravity model herein makes two predictions for the effect of 
tariffs on bilateral trade: (1) bilateral trade depends on all available tariffs, including 
MFN and RTA tariffs, and (2) the trade is always negatively associated with RTA tariffs, 
while the effect of MFN tariffs on trade depends on several factors and parameters. It can 
be even positive, indicating that when MFN tariffs are reduced, trade values decrease 
because some RTA users switch over as MFN users when the tariffs are reduced. These 
switching exporters decrease their volume of exports because MFN rates are still higher 
than RTA rates after those reductions. 
Next, the gravity equation with tariff variables is estimated for worldwide trade. 
Specifically, various equations are estimated, which include the equation with only MFN 
tariffs, only RTA tariffs, and both MFN and RTA tariffs. Comparing the estimates in 
these tariffs, the direction and magnitude of the bias resulting from omitting either type 
of tariff are discussed. Consequently, given the positive association between MFN and 
RTA tariffs, the estimate in MFN tariffs in the equation without RTA tariffs is found to 
suffer from downward bias, and its positive effect is underestimated. Similarly, 
excluding MFN tariffs is found to yield upward bias and underestimates the negative 
coefficient for RTA tariffs. Thus, the use of applied tariffs is justified subject to 
controlling for MFN tariffs by introducing the fixed effects defined at an appropriate 
level (e.g., importer-product-year fixed effects). Otherwise, the estimates suffer from 
omitted-variable bias. 
                                                   
1 Specifically, imports in Australia from the United States or Canada are approximately 50%. The 
share of European Union imports from Mexico is approximately 80%. A similar share can be found in 
the case of U.S. imports from Australia. 
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Several researchers have focused on the specification, testing, and validation of 
gravity equations. Several authors, such as Anderson (1979), Bergstrand (1985), Helpman 
and Krugman (1985), Bergstrand (1989), Deardorff (1998), Eaton and Kortum (2002), and 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), have examined the theories. Gravity equations have 
been developed by allowing firm heterogeneity similar to à la Melitz (2003), including 
Chaney (2008), Helpman et al. (2008), Bergstrand et al. (2015), Anderson et al. (2016), and 
Heid and Larch (2016). Nevertheless, no studies have focused on including tariffs in the 
gravity analysis.2 From a theoretical perspective, the coefficient for tariffs is associated 
with trade elasticity or the elasticity of substitution, which is crucial in quantifying the 
welfare impacts of tariff reduction (Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare, 2014). Thus, the 
possible magnitude and direction of the bias in tariff coefficients are demonstrated. This 
empirical study helps address tariff variables in the gravity estimation. 
The remainder of this study is presented as follows. Section 2 presents the gravity 
equation. Sections 3 and 4 show the empirical framework and results, respectively. 
Section 5 concludes the study. 
 
 
2. Gravity Equation with the Choice of a Tariff Scheme 
This section presents the gravity equation considering the exporters’ choice among 
alternative tariff schemes. 3  The theoretical discussion is based on Demidova and 
Krishna (2008) and Cherkashin et al. (2015), wherein two alternative tariff schemes, MFN 
and RTA, are available for exporters. The tradeoff mechanism presented in these studies 
is introduced into the gravity framework developed by Chaney (2008). 
While exporting, firms can choose either MFN (𝑀𝑀) or RTA (𝑅𝑅) tariff scheme. Let 𝑖𝑖, 
𝑗𝑗, and 𝑝𝑝 indicate the exporting country, importing country, and product, respectively. In 
both types of schemes, exporters must pay fixed costs for exports, denoted by 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 . 
Further, when exporting under the RTA scheme, they also incur additional fixed costs, 
such as those to certify the origin of goods, which are denoted by 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅 . These fixed costs 
vary by exporting countries and products. Here, 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀 and 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅  denote the (one plus) 
MFN and RTA tariff rates, respectively (𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀, 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅  >1). While the former rates are the same 
across exporting countries, the latter are specific to the country pair (and product). When 
exporting under the RTA scheme, exporters should comply with the rules of origin 
(RoO), which warrants a change in their procurement sources, which in turn leads to a 
rise in procurement costs. Such procurement adjustment costs are captured by 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 as 
ad valorem cost for RTA usage (𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 > 1), which differ by country pairs and products.4 
                                                   
2 Hayakawa (2013) introduced applied tariffs into the gravity equation but did not differentiate those 
with MFN tariffs and did not examine the possible bias of omitting MFN tariffs. 
3 The details of the derivation are provided in Appendix A. 
4 The procurement adjustment costs are based on the RoO, which varies by RTAs. Thus, we assume 
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We assume 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅 < 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀. Therefore, exporters face a tradeoff at which they enjoy lower 
variable cost (𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅 ) while paying an additional fixed cost (𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅) when they use an RTA 
tariff scheme. 
We introduce this tradeoff into the gravity framework and examine how MFN and 
RTA tariff rates affect the product-level bilateral trade. Consequently, the following 
product-level gravity equation that presents potential determinants of bilateral trade is 
obtained: 








𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖  is the bilateral trade of each product, 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 is the weight on each product in the 
importing country’s utility, 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 (𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗) is the exporting (importing) country’s total income, 𝑌𝑌 
is the global gross domestic product (GDP), and 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 is the wage in the exporting country. 
𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 is the shape parameter of the Pareto distribution of exporting country’s productivity. 
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 is the trade cost component defined by 




















 𝜎𝜎𝑝𝑝 − 1. (2) 
𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 is the elasticity of substitution among differentiated products. 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 is the multilateral 
resistance variable (MRV) discussed in Chaney (2008) and varies by importing countries 
and products.5 
This study focuses on the case where some exporters use the MFN scheme and 
others the RTA scheme to reveal the role of both MFN and RTA tariff rates. This case is 
called the heterogeneous regime, which is realized when the tariff reduction under the 
RTA scheme does not overcome additional utilization costs of the scheme. Specifically, 










If condition (3) is violated, all exporters use the RTA scheme. This case is called the 
homogeneous regime in which MFN rates do not affect the product-level bilateral 
exports because no firms use MFN rates. 
     In addition to standard gravity factors such as outputs in importing and exporting 
countries, the gravity equation (1) reveals how tariff rates, fixed costs, and procurement 
adjustment cost affect the product-level bilateral trade. The gravity equation indicates 
that RTA tariff rates (𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅 ), the procurement adjustment cost (𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖), and the fixed costs (𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
and 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅) have negative effects on exports.6 The sign of the effect of MFN tariff rates (𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀) 
is not determined. When MFN rates are reduced, some firms that sold only in their 
                                                                                                                                                                        
that those costs are specific to country-pair (and product). 
5 The definition of 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 is given in (A4) in Appendix A. 
6 Elasticities are provided in Appendix B. 
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domestic market start exporting, indicating the negative coefficient for MFN rates. 
However, some RTA users switch to use MFN rates when MFN rates are reduced. If 
MFN rates are higher than RTA rates, (tariff-inclusive) export prices set by these 
exporters become higher after they switch. Therefore, demand falls, and export values 
decrease, implying a positive coefficient. However, given that MFN rates affect 
product-level bilateral trade, omitting these rates leads to an omitted-variable problem. 
 
3. Empirical Framework 
Based on the earlier theoretical discussion, this section provides the empirical 
framework to examine how gravity estimates are biased if tariff rates are not adequately 
controlled for. Specifically, the following product-level gravity equations are estimated to 
identify the direction and magnitude of the bias. 
 ln𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 × ln�1 + 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 . (4) 
 ln𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽 × ln�1 + 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 . (5) 
 ln𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 × ln�1 + 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + 𝛽𝛽 × ln�1 + 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 . (6) 
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is the exports of product p from country i to country j in year t. 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 
𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 are MFN tariffs and RTA tariffs, respectively. MFN tariffs do not differ across 
exporting countries. Further, RTA tariffs are equal to MFN tariffs if any tariffs under the 
RTA regimes are not available. Thus, this variable of RTA tariff rates is called “applied 
tariff rates.” 7  𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 , 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 , and 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  are the country pair-year fixed effects, country 
pair-product fixed effects, and exporter-product-year fixed effects, respectively. 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a 
disturbance term. 
Three types of fixed effects control for various elements that affect bilateral trade. 
The country pair-year fixed effects capture the time-variant country pair characteristics 
such as exchange rates or other bilateral trade facilitation arrangements. This type of 
fixed effect also contributes to controlling for country-level market sizes represented by 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 , 𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗 , and 𝑌𝑌 in equation (1). The country pair-product fixed effects control for the 
standard gravity elements, including geographical distance, historical ties, or cultural 
similarity in addition to various parameters such as the elasticity of substitution and the 
weight in the utility function (𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖). This type of fixed effect also controls for procurement 
adjustment costs (𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 ) and two types of fixed costs (𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  and 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅 ). 8  Finally, the 
                                                   
7 From the theoretical perspective, the coefficients for tariff variables should be different across 
countries and products. However, we do not differentiate those and estimate the average magnitude. 
8 While this theoretical framework does not incorporate the time dimension, each parameter or 
variable changes over time. In particular, although fixed costs are assumed time-invariant, these costs 
might be controlled for by exporter-product-year fixed effects if they change over time. By contrast, 
procurement adjustment costs are based on the RoO, which does not usually change over time. 
Furthermore, we control for the change of factor prices, which affects the magnitude of originated 
value-added, by exporter-product-year fixed effects. Thus, we claim that the effects of procurement 
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exporter-product-year fixed effects capture the supply-side characteristics such as factor 
prices and technology in exporting countries ( 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 ). In these equations, no 
importer-product-year fixed effects are introduced to explicitly examine the role of MFN 
rates, which have the variation at the same level as those fixed effects. 
     As shown earlier, the equation should include both MFN and RTA tariffs. Thus, 
compared with estimates in equation (6), those in equations (4) and (5) are biased 
because of omitting either type of tariff. By comparing the results in these two equations, 
the direction and magnitude of the bias are known when not controlling for both types 
of tariffs. Furthermore, for more consistent estimates in RTA tariffs, we control for 
importer-product-year fixed effects (𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) as follows. 
 ln𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽 × ln�1 + 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 . (7) 
A comparison of the estimates between equations (6) and (7) show the direction and 
magnitude of the bias when not controlling for the remaining time-variant 
importer-product-level characteristics such as MRV (𝜃𝜃) or product-level demand sizes. 
A product is defined at an HS six-digit level. The study years are 1995, 2000, 2005, 
2010, and 2015. Although the data are available every year, the data of every five years 
are used to reduce the computational burden in the estimation. The data sources are as 
follows. Trade data are obtained from the CEPII.9 It is called “BACI” database and is an 
updated version of the data provided in Gaulier and Zignago (2010). The database offers 
disaggregated data on bilateral trade flows for 222 countries. The tariff variables are 
constructed by employing the data on tariffs from the WITS database.10 In particular, a 
variable of RTA tariffs includes both RTA tariffs and unilateral preference tariffs (e.g., the 
generalized system of preferences, GSP) or other preference tariffs. When 
multiple-preference rates are available, the lowest rates are chosen for each tariff-line 
code. As mentioned earlier, when any preference tariffs are unavailable, the MFN tariffs 
are chosen. Then, the tariffs up to an HS six-digit-level are averaged by simple average. 
Table 1 presents the basic statistics for the variables. The models are estimated by the 
ordinary least square (OLS).11 
 
=== Table 1 === 
 
                                                                                                                                                                        
adjustment costs are controlled for by our set of fixed effects. 
9 http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.asp?id=37 
10 http://wits.worldbank.org/WITS/ 
11 This study excludes zero-valued trade but includes a log of trade. This exclusion is because we 
estimate for the trade of approximately 5,000 products among more than 200 countries for 5 years. 
Thus, even if the observations with zero-valued trade are excluded, the number of observations 
exceeds 20 million. Furthermore, the number of dummy variables for fixed effects is nearly nine 
million. Thus, applying nonlinear estimation techniques (e.g., pseudo-Poisson maximum likelihood 
technique) to this model is beyond the scope of computation, and the log-likelihood is less likely to 




4. Empirical Results 
This section presents the estimation results. Following Egger and Tarlea (2015), the 
standard errors are clustered by country pair-product and year. The OLS results of 
equations (4), (5), and (6) for all products are, respectively, as shown in columns (I), (II), 
and (III) in the upper panel of Table 2. In the former two columns, both MFN and RTA 
tariffs have significantly negative coefficients. In column (III), when both MFN and RTA 
tariffs are introduced simultaneously, the coefficient for RTA tariffs remains negative 
while that for MFN tariffs becomes significantly positive. Furthermore, the absolute 
magnitude of the coefficient for RTA tariffs increases, indicating an underestimation of 
the negative impact of RTA rates when the impact of MFN rates is ignored. The degree of 
this underestimation reaches approximately at 14.6% ( ≈ 100 ×
[|−0.715|− |−0.624|] |−0.624|⁄ ). Specifically, a 1% reduction of RTA tariffs increases 
trade by 0.7%, while a 1% reduction of MFN tariffs decreases it by 0.1%. Thus, a 
contrasting effect on trade was found between MFN and RTA tariffs. 
 
=== Table 2 === 
 
Section 2 theoretically demonstrated that the sign of the effect of MFN tariff rates is 
unclear. Along with reductions in MFN rates, there is a rise in the number of exporters as 
more potential exporters enter the market, which increases the total exports. By contrast, 
some RTA users switch to MFN in response to MFN tariff rate reductions. There is a fall 
in exports by these switching exporters because MFN rates are still higher than RTA 
rates after those reductions. These contrasting effects offset each other, thus obscuring 
the net effect of MFN rates on trade. Our empirical results imply that the latter effect 
dominates the former and that the resulting net effect is positive; the reduction of MFN 
tariffs decreases exports. Conversely, consistent with the discussion in Section 2, RTA 
tariffs are negatively associated with exports. 
Further, a comparison of the results in the three columns shows that the 
relationship between MFN and RTA tariffs is important for interpreting their differences. 
In this study sample, these two tariffs are positively correlated, partly because RTA 
tariffs cannot be higher than MFN tariffs. Thus, in the products with low MFN tariffs, 
RTA tariffs must be similar to or lower than MFN tariffs, which results in a positive 
relationship between the two tariffs. Besides, from a theoretical perspective, owing to the 
tariff-complementarity effect (Bagwell and Staiger, 1999), the reduction of tariffs through 
RTAs induces countries to decrease MFN tariffs. Some empirical studies support this 
effect (e.g., Estevadeordal et al., 2008; Calvo-Pardo et al., 2011). 
Given this positive association between MFN and RTA tariffs, the comparison in 
the coefficient for MFN tariffs between columns (I) and (III) indicates that the 
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disturbance term in equation (4) is negatively correlated with MFN tariffs.12 As found in 
column (III), RTA tariffs are negatively associated with exports and thereby the 
disturbance term in equation (4). Given that such RTA tariffs are positively correlated 
with MFN tariffs, the estimate in MFN tariffs in equation (4) suffers from the downward 
bias, and its positive effect is underestimated. Similarly, the comparison in the coefficient 
for RTA tariffs between columns (II) and (III) indicates that the disturbance term in 
equation (5) is positively correlated with RTA tariffs. Again, as shown in column (III), 
MFN tariffs have a positive association with exports. Thus, omitting MFN tariffs yields 
the upward bias and underestimates the negative coefficient for RTA tariffs. 
Next, equation (7) is estimated, which controls for the remaining time-variant 
importer-product-level characteristics such as MRV or product-level demand sizes. The 
result is shown in column (IV). The coefficient for RTA tariffs is again estimated to be 
significantly negative. Its magnitude does not change significantly compared with that in 
column (III). The absolute magnitude slightly decreases. For example, larger 
product-level demand size leads naturally to larger trade. Furthermore, since products 
with large demand are liberalized in RTAs (Baier and Bergstrand, 2004), the 
product-level demand size is negatively associated with RTA tariffs. As a result, the 
remaining time-variant importer-product-level characteristics yield a negative 
correlation between RTA tariffs and the disturbance term in equation (6) and thereby 
create a small and downward bias in the estimate in RTA tariffs in equation (6). 
Nevertheless, MFN tariffs account for a major part of the time-variant 
importer-product-level characteristics in the effects on trade because the coefficient for 
RTA tariffs does not differ significantly between columns (III) and (IV). 
In the lower panel of Table 1, the study products are restricted only to those where 
RTA tariffs are lower than MFN tariffs (i.e., RTA-eligible products), while the trade in all 
products is studied in the upper panel. Specifically, in the upper panel, the study 
observations include even trade with RTA nonmember countries. The focus on 
RTA-eligible products has pros and cons. One advantage is that two tariff variables 
assume distinct values. Thus, their role is separately identified. However, this leads to 
identifying the effects of RTA tariffs only through the over-time change of RTA tariffs per 
se. In other words, the identified effect excludes the effect of eliminating tariffs 
immediately after the start of RTA tariff reduction. It reflects the effects of the gradual 
reduction of RTA tariffs. Thus, the study products tend to be sensitive compared with 
those where tariffs are immediately eliminated (Maggi and Rodríguez-Clare, 2007). 
The sign and statistical significance in tariff variables remain unchanged compared 
with the result in the upper panel, except for MFN tariffs in column (III). Overall, the 
coefficients for MFN and RTA tariffs decrease compared with those in the upper panel. 
                                                   
12 We do not statistically test the differences in the coefficient magnitude across columns because 
their tests need computation of the variance–covariance matrices of residuals. Their computation is 
practically infeasible in our models with nearly nine million dummy variables for fixed effects. 
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In particular, the absolute value in RTA tariffs increases. Thus, the trade in sensitive 
products changes significantly by a tariff reduction than the average among all products. 
Moreover, the coefficient for RTA tariffs increases remarkably in column (IV) compared 
with that in column (III). It also becomes larger than the coefficient obtained in column 
(II). These results imply that there are some significant importer-product-year elements 
that create a negative correlation between RTA tariffs and the disturbance terms in 
equations (5) and (6). Given that the study products are mainly sensitive products in this 
estimation, protection for domestic producers appears to be a key factor. A higher level 
of protection leads to a higher level of RTA tariffs and to the smaller value of trade. 
Finally, these models are estimated for differentiated and nondifferentiated 
products separately. The differentiated products are classified based on the “liberal” 
classification of products by Rauch (1999). Table 3 reports the estimation results. Given 
that the coefficients for tariffs are related to the elasticity of substitution, the absolute 
magnitude is slightly larger in nondifferentiated than in differentiated products. Overall, 
the results in both types of products are similar to those in the upper panel in Table 2. 
Notably, the coefficient for RTA tariffs in column (IV) further decreases in 
nondifferentiated products. Thus, in contrast to the earlier results, in the case of 
nondifferentiated products, some dominant importer-product-year elements exist that 
create the positive correlation between RTA tariffs and the disturbance terms in equations 
(5) and (6). Given that agricultural goods are categorized into nondifferentiated products, 
nontariff measures (NTMs), such as sanitary and phytosanitary measures, are significant 
measures. Instead of reducing tariffs via RTAs, countries may introduce NTMs such as 
decreasing trade (e.g., Beverelli et al., 2019; Niu et al., 2020). 
 
=== Table 3 === 
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
This study examined tariff variables in the gravity equation and demonstrated that 
when multiple tariff schemes are available, omitting tariffs in either scheme creates a 
remarkable bias in the estimates. Specifically, omitting MFN tariff yields upward bias 
and underestimates the negative coefficient for RTA tariffs. Similarly, the estimate in 
MFN tariffs in the equation without RTA tariffs suffers from the downward bias, and its 
positive effect is underestimated. Thus, to obtain consistent estimates, all available tariff 
variables or control for those rates must be included by introducing appropriate fixed 
effects. Although this study did not differentiate between RTA and other preference 
tariffs (e.g., GSP tariffs), such differentiation is also important. Furthermore, most of the 
studies estimate the gravity equation at a country pair-year level rather than a country 
pair-product-year level. At this level of analysis, the introduction of only applied tariffs 
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can produce consistent estimates if we control for importer-year fixed effects. Such fixed 
effects are often introduced to control for importer’s MRV. Therefore, the coefficient for 
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Table 1. Basic Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ln Value 21,285,150 4.035 2.398 0 17.735
ln (1+MFN) 21,285,150 0.073 0.087 0 3.434
ln (1+RTA) 21,285,150 0.055 0.088 0 3.434  




Table 2. Gravity Results 
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
FE: ijt, ijp, ipt X X X
FE: ijt, ijp, ipt, jpt X
(i) All
ln (1+MFN) -0.518*** 0.112**
[0.064] [0.026]
ln (1+RTA) -0.624*** -0.715*** -0.709***
[0.072] [0.074] [0.124]
Adj R-squared 0.7179 0.718 0.718 0.7214
Number of obs. 21,285,150 21,285,150 21,285,150 21,285,150
(ii) RTA < MFN
ln (1+MFN) -0.624*** 0.084
[0.085] [0.055]
ln (1+RTA) -0.774*** -0.838*** -0.747***
[0.087] [0.080] [0.126]
Adj R-squared 0.7239 0.724 0.724 0.722
Number of obs. 11,822,900 11,822,900 11,822,900 11,822,900  
Notes: The dependent variable is a log of exports defined at country pair-product-year. This model is 
estimated by the OLS. ***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively. Standard error 
is clustered by country pair-product and year. “ijt,” “ijp,” “ipt,” and “jpt” refer to country pair-year 
fixed effects, country pair-product fixed effects, exporter-product-year fixed effects, and 
importer-product-year fixed effects, respectively. In panel (ii), the study products are restricted only 







Table 3. Differentiated Products versus Nondifferentiated Products 
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
FE: ijt, ijp, ipt X X X
FE: ijt, ijp, ipt, jpt X
(i) Differentiated products
ln (1+MFN) -0.498*** 0.129**
[0.071] [0.042]
ln (1+RTA) -0.604*** -0.709*** -0.709***
[0.080] [0.084] [0.116]
Adj R-squared 0.7229 0.723 0.723 0.727
Number of obs. 14,626,027 14,626,027 14,626,027 14,626,027
(ii) Non-differentiated products
ln (1+MFN) -0.543*** 0.086
[0.049] [0.042]
ln (1+RTA) -0.652*** -0.721*** -0.727***
[0.058] [0.074] [0.148]
Adj R-squared 0.7032 0.7032 0.7032 0.7028
Number of obs. 6,647,403 6,647,403 6,647,403 6,647,403  
Notes: In this table, the models are estimated for differentiated and nondifferentiated products 
separately. The classification of differentiated products is based on the “liberal” classification of 
products by Rauch (1999). The dependent variable is a log of exports defined at country 
pair-product-year. This model is estimated by the OLS. ***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% 
significance, respectively. Standard error is clustered by country pair-product and year. “ijt,” “ijp,” 
“ipt,” and “jpt” refer to country pair-year fixed effects, country pair-product fixed effects, 






Appendix A. Derivation of the Gravity Equation 
 
A.1. Representative Household’s Utility 
The basic structure of the present model follows Chaney (2008). There are 𝑃𝑃 + 1 
types of products. 𝑃𝑃  is the number of differentiated products. Product 𝑝𝑝 = 0  is a 
homogeneous product, and others (𝑝𝑝 = 1⋯𝑃𝑃) are differentiated. The utility function of 
the representative household in importing country 𝑗𝑗 is given by 










,𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 > 1,  
where 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖(𝜔𝜔) is the consumption of the product 𝑝𝑝 produced by firm 𝜔𝜔, 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖  is the 
elasticity of substitution among differentiated products, and 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 is the utility weight on 
product 𝑝𝑝 (𝜇𝜇0 + ∑ 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖=1 = 1). 
 
A.2. Trade Costs and Production 
Regarding the structure of trade costs, this study follows Demidova and Krishna 
(2008). Let 𝜑𝜑  be productivity of each firm, 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖  the (one plus) tariff rate between 
exporting country 𝑖𝑖 to importing country 𝑗𝑗 and 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 is the wage. The wage is identical 
across products given the labor mobility in each country. 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖  is equal to 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀 (𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅 ) when 
the exporter utilizes an MFN (RTA) tariff scheme. Marginal cost is given by 
 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 =
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖
𝜑𝜑 .  
When exporting under RTA schemes, exporters must comply with the rules of origin, for 
which they must change their procurement sources, which leads to a rise in procurement 
costs. Such procurement adjustment costs are captured by 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 as ad valorem cost for 
RTA utilization (𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 > 1). 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀 and 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅  are the ad valorem MFN tariff (𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀 > 1) and RTA 
tariff (𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅 > 1), respectively. We assume 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅 < 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀 so that not all exports are always 
undertaken under the RTA scheme. Therefore, the free on board price of the 





𝜑𝜑 .  
We assume that productivity follows the Pareto distribution with the following 
cumulative distribution function: 
 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖(𝜑𝜑) = 1 −𝜑𝜑−𝛾𝛾𝑝𝑝 .  
𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 is the shape parameter of the distribution and it is assumed that 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 > 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 − 1 to 
preclude the case where the trade value is dispersed. It is assumed that exporters must 
bear two types of fixed costs depending on the choice of tariff schemes. One is the usual 
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fixed costs for exporting (𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) in the labor unit. Exporters must bear this fixed cost 
regardless of the choice of tariff schemes. The other is the fixed cost for RTA use (𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅). 
This cost includes documentation preparation to obtain the certificates of origin, and 
only exporters who use an RTA tariff scheme must bear this cost.13 
 
A.3. Demand for Differentiated Products 
Following Chaney (2008), it is assumed that the number of firms in each country 𝑛𝑛 
is positively associated with national labor income (𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛𝐿𝐿𝑛𝑛) to obtain a tractable gravity 
framework. Moreover, it is assumed that each worker has 𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛 shares of the global fund. 
This global fund gathers all the profits of firms in the world (𝜋𝜋) and distributes it to 
workers. Therefore, the total income of workers in country 𝑗𝑗 (𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗) is given by the sum of 
labor income (𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗) and dividend (𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗𝜋𝜋). Therefore, 
 𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗 = 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗 + 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗𝜋𝜋.  
Given the demand function derived by the representative household’s cost minimization, 
the value of export by an exporter with productivity 𝜑𝜑, which produces the product 𝑝𝑝 
of country 𝑖𝑖, is written as 






Assuming ℳ𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖(ℛ𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖) is the set of producers who export under an MFN (RTA) scheme, 
𝑉𝑉𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖  and 𝜋𝜋 are, respectively, given by 
 



































 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖(𝜑𝜑) = �𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖(𝜑𝜑) − 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖(𝜑𝜑)�𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖(𝜑𝜑) − 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 .  
                                                   
13 Following Helpman et al. (2004) and Helpman et al. (2008), it is assumed that exporters pay fixed 
costs for exports to each destination without considering the case where exporters deal with export 
processes for multiple destinations at the same time, thus saving on the total fixed cost. That is, 
economies of scale are not considered for 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. Further, in terms of the fixed cost for RTA usage, a 
similar situation is assumed, that is, exporters pay the fixed cost for RTA usage for each transaction. 
Given that the model is static, mitigation of these fixed costs through exporters' experiences is not 
considered. Investigating these possibilities would provide additional theoretical material, but no 
such cases are examined to keep the model tractable and help obtain an explicit gravity equation. 
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The upper-right subscripts 𝑀𝑀 and 𝑅𝑅 represent MFN and RTA schemes, respectively. 
 
A.4. Homogeneous and Heterogeneous Regimes 
Export profits under MFN and RTA schemes are, respectively, given by 













− 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  and  












− 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅 .  
Therefore, export profits under respective schemes become positive when 𝜑𝜑 > 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀  and 
𝜑𝜑 > 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖
𝑅𝑅 , where 
 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖


























Further, the profit under an RTA scheme becomes larger than that under an MFN 
scheme when 𝜑𝜑 > 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖




























It is assumed that fixed trade costs (𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  and 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅) are high enough so that these thresholds 
are higher than the lower-bound productivity (𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀 , 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖
𝑅𝑅 , 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖
𝑅𝑅>𝑀𝑀 > 1). As shown in 
figures A1 and A2, some exporters use an MFN scheme and others use an RTA scheme 














This corresponds to equation (2). In other words, some exporters do not use an RTA 
scheme when the fixed cost for RTA use (𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅) is large, RTA tariff rate (𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅 ) is not low 
enough, or the elasticity of substitution (𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖) is low. This case is called the heterogeneous 
regime following Demidova and Krishna (2008). If condition (A2) does not hold, all the 
exporters use an RTA scheme. This case is called the homogeneous regime. 
 
=== Figures A1 and A2 === 
 
A.5. Multilateral Resistance Variable 
Combining equations and rearranging, the price index can be solved as 
 𝑉𝑉𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 = 𝜆𝜆2𝑖𝑖𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗
1
𝛾𝛾𝑝𝑝
− 1𝜎𝜎𝑝𝑝−1𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖, (A3) 
where 












































































The heterogeneous regime reveals the role of both MFN and RTA tariff rates. In the case 
of the homogeneous regime, the MFN rate does not affect the bilateral exports. 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 is 
called the multilateral resistance variable (MRV) in Chaney (2008). 
 
A.6. Export Value 












































1−𝜎𝜎  and  
 𝜆𝜆4𝑖𝑖 = �
𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖









Using these equations, threshold productivity values are obtained as follows: 
 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖





















𝜎𝜎𝑝𝑝−1, and  
 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖






























Then, using (A5), the gravity equation explaining product-level bilateral exports is 
derived as 
 



















with the trade cost component 





















These equations correspond to equations (1) and (2), respectively. The global total profit 









𝑖𝑖=1  and  


















Figure A1. Productivity and the Choice of Tariff Schemes in the Heterogeneous Regime 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 






Figure A2. Productivity and the Choice of Tariff Schemes in the Homogeneous Regime 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
Note: In the figure, we define Φ𝑖𝑖 as Φ𝑖𝑖 ≡ 𝜑𝜑𝜎𝜎𝑝𝑝−1.  
21 
 
Appendix B. Elasticities 
To obtain partial derivatives, following Chaney (2008), it is assumed that the MRV 
is not affected by bilateral trade costs: 𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 𝜕𝜕𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀⁄ = 𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 𝜕𝜕𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅⁄ = 𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 𝜕𝜕𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖⁄ =
𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 𝜕𝜕𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖⁄ = 𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 𝜕𝜕𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅⁄ = 0. This assumption is accepted when the exporter’s country is 
small enough to be compared to the rest of the world. Therefore, based on equations (1) 


























































































































































𝜎𝜎𝑝𝑝−1 < 0  
These elasticities indicate that RTA tariff rates (𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅 ), the procurement adjustment cost 
(𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖), and fixed costs for exporting (𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) and RTA usage (𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅) have negative effects on 
exports while the sign of the effect of MFN tariff rates (𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀) is not determined. 
